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THE MARGINAL UTILITY OF MARGINAL GUIDANCE: 
COMMENTARY ON TOO MANY ALERTS, TOO MUCH LIABILITY: 
SORTING THROUGH THE MALPRACTICE IMPLICATIONS OF 
DRUG-DRUG INTERACTION CLINICAL DECISION SUPPORT BY  
M. SUSAN RIDGELY AND MICHAEL D. GREENBERG 
ROSS KOPPEL* 
I am delighted Susan Ridgely and Michael Greenberg wrote Too Many 
Alerts, Too Much Liability: Sorting Through the Malpractice Implications of 
Drug-Drug Interaction Clinical Decision Support.1  Their work contributes 
much to our understanding of the legal conundrums engendered by clinical 
decision support (“CDS”).  My comments, thus, are not attempts to fault 
their arguments or data.  Rather, I seek to augment their article to include 
three areas where I wish they had continued their useful work.  The three 
areas are: 
1. CDS’s vulnerabilities to liability come from far more than just drug-
drug interaction (“DDI”) alerts and DDI databases.  As I shall show, 
DDIs are just a small fraction of CDS, and even a smaller fraction of 
the liability risks faced by providers, medical institutions, and health 
information technology (“HIT”) vendors. 
2. The underlying logic of CDS’s evidence is often more dubious than 
indicated by Ridgely and Greenberg.  The data on which CDS 
information are based require clinical trial sample selection and 
protocols that restrict subjects to patients with only one disease and 
one medication.  This is good for science and useless for application 
to real-life patients.  Also, because of the limits of electronic health 
records’ (“EHR”) data standards and interoperability, CDS cannot 
mine the vast information oceans that would otherwise be available.  
Nuanced understanding of the multivariate issues is usually 
impossible.  What do we know about the interactions of the 4,000—
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5,000 drugs in the average formulary?  How can we match that 
almost infinite matrix with the additional constraints of patients with 
compromised kidney, liver and cardiovascular functions? 
3. CDS is presented without the context of its application and 
knowledge of its end-users.  Specifically, I refer to the inconsistent 
alerts and guidance even within the same hospital. Interns and many 
residents, who rotate every thirty days, often depend on dosage 
alerts, order-sets or DDI alerts when confronted with unfamiliar 
medications.  Because the range of permitted dosages, and even the 
existence of any alerts, can vary from service to service and from 
hospital to hospital, residents often prescribe with the expectation of 
a safety net comprised of warnings and alerts.  Alas, the net may be 
missing or configured for very different purposes.  Medication orders 
are entered with the false belief that dangerous doses or 
combinations are systematically flagged. 
A. CDS is Much More than Drug-Drug Interaction Alerts 
CDS is far more than drug-drug interaction alarms.  For example, the 
following are clearly forms of computer-mediated information that involved 
consequential decisions by clinicians and IT developers: 
The order of, and inclusion of, medications on drop down lists.  We 
know that the ranking of options (and the inclusion of some versus others) is 
stunningly influential.2 In experimental settings, where the choices are 
artificially rotated, the top option is more frequently selected.3  Moreover, 
inclusion of an item in the drop down menu is usually based on 
compromises, power relations among staff, traditional choices, and other 
not entirely scientific rationales. 
Order sets.  Order sets are the subject of intense debate among hospital 
staff.  They differ dramatically from service to service and from hospital to 
hospital.  Order sets reflect the influence of Chief Medical Officers, Chief 
Medical Information Officers, pharmacy departments, IT divisions, and 
medicine or surgery chiefs.  Younger physicians, especially, are influenced 
by order sets. 
Dosage limits/guidance.  As noted above, these vary widely and often; 
and differ by institution or service, often with no logical explanation. 
Tapers.  Tapers provide useful algorithms to steadily reduce a patient’s 
drug levels over the course of several days.  We find, however, that 
residents’ understanding of the use and even knowledge of the existence of 
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tapers varies dramatically by previous experience on this or that service, and 
on exposure to mentors who may or may not be familiar with these 
functions.  In my own ongoing study at my university hospital, I found that 
one-half of residents knew about tapers and the other half did not.  But the 
underlying software and the Computerized Physician Order Entry (“CPOE”) 
system were the same for all. 
Titration algorithms (e.g. amount of insulin to administer in relation to 
patient’s blood sugar levels).  These are also forms of CDS.  Reliance on 
these algorithms makes sense, but picking incorrect or uncertain parameters 
could endanger patients and would subject the user to liability. 
Allergy alerts.  There are a number of problems with allergy alerts: (1) 
Many listed allergies are incorrect.  Patients are often confused about what 
they tell the intake personnel.  (2) In many computer systems, the modal 
listed allergy is “other.”  This is not useful.  (3) Several CPOE systems do not 
display allergies until after the provider has ordered the medication.  Also, 
the display of drug allergies is often obscured in a maze of confusing 
messages and warnings. 
Lifetime medication limits.  These are obviously useful, but they are 
dependent on a full history of previously prescribed, relevant medications.  
Alas, lack of data standards and interoperability mitigate the probability that 
patient records are complete. 
Drug-drug interactions.  As discussed above, the permutations and 
combinations are massive and often unknown.   Moreover, because 
hospitals and vendors do not wish to be accused of “missing” a possible 
alert, the systems inundate providers with irrelevant alerts, most of which are 
ignored. 
Treatment protocols.  Also a form of guidance, treatment protocols may 
be questioned in court if one follows them or fails to follow them.  Perhaps 
more importantly, we know that misdiagnoses are common—representing 
over 20% of all diagnoses.4  Following the treatment protocol for the wrong 
disease is probably not a winning argument in a malpractice trial. 
In sum, CDS is embodied in many of the aspects of HIT.  Each of these 
several forms of CDS exposes the provider and medical facilities to 
significant liability risks if anything goes wrong. If the forms of CDS are 
issued by vendors, then vendors also face liability risks. 
B. The Underlying Logic of CDS 
The theoretical logic of CDS is impeccable.  With the use of HIT, 
dosage guidelines and warnings are supposed to reflect the latest and best 
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research.  So if some combination of medications is found to work better 
than some old standby, CDS will provide up-to-date information exactly 
when the physician is ordering the relevant medication(s).  Similarly, if a 
previously standard dosage has been shown to be higher or lower than 
needed, CDS will also help physicians make the best choice.  The use of the 
best and most recent medication guidelines is part of evidenced-based 
medicine (“EBM”), the use of research-based practices to improve patient 
treatment and reduce adverse drug events.5  In reality, CDS generates 
frustrations more consistently than any other form of HIT.  As Ridgely and 
Greenberg note, providers quickly become enraged at the constant (but 
irrelevant) reminders associated with many of the medication orders they 
enter.6 
In one study of 300 overrides of CDS alerts, researchers found that all 
300 were medically correct.7  That is, the physicians did not err in ignoring 
the clinical decision support system alerts, but rather they made appropriate 
decisions in overriding them.  From the physician’s perspective, all of the 
CDS alerts were wrong (or at least unhelpful) and generated a lot of make-
work.  Note that the study did not claim the CDS alerts were wrong, rather, 
that what the doctors did was also not wrong.8 
In addition to being annoying, CDS recommendations are often 
misguided or missing.  A study by Jane Metzger and colleagues found that 
CDS “detected only 53 percent of [all] medication orders that would have 
resulted in fatalities, and it detected anywhere from 10 to 82 percent of 
orders that would have caused serious adverse events.”9  Drugs prescribed 
for a wrong diagnosis were caught only 15 % of the time (that is, in cases in 
which the computer already had the patient’s record and could “know” that 
the drug was inappropriate), and drugs that were wrong for a patient of a 
given age were intercepted only 14.1% of the time.10 
As noted in the introduction, CDS alerts are ideally based on the latest 
research; and no one could be against evidence-based medicine.11  The 
problem, however, is the research is usually conducted with carefully 
selected samples of patients so that researchers can observe the effects of 
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the medicine or treatment without additional interference from other 
conditions.  The flaw is that hospitals are full of elderly patients suffering 
from multiple organ system problems, with a long list of co-morbidities, and 
taking many medications.  Therefore it is often a great leap to apply findings 
from a study under “ideal conditions” to a fragile patient. That is, a 
medication that has been shown to be effective for a particular type of liver 
problem may dangerously strain the kidneys of elderly patients.  So the 
physician must then balance the CDS information with the various 
vulnerabilities of the real patient in front of her. 
As can be immediately imagined, physicians must constantly deal with 
these messy tradeoffs, and the utility of EBM-generated guidelines is 
mitigated by the complex challenges of the sick patients.  This mix of clear-
cut research with the messy reality of medical practice means that CDS 
guidance is often not fully applicable; physicians’ reactions to alerts and 
recommendations reflects not only alert fatigue or professional pride but 
also a considered understanding of the complexity of medical care.  
Moreover, there are as yet unknown implications of the use of CDS 
recommendations for medical students and residents who have grown up 
with these systems and have never practiced medicine without them. 
C. Dangers of Multiple Systems and Differing Alerts 
Lastly, as previously noted, medical residents rotate from service to 
service and/or from hospital to hospital.  Because many of the diseases and 
medications they encounter are new to them, the residents often place 
undue trust in the alerts and order sets.  But, as has been noted, these alerts 
vary dramatically from service to service and from hospital to hospital.  They 
may often be nonexistent or temporarily shut down while committees 
reconsider the levels or combinations of medications and treatments.  In a 
similar process, many experienced physicians work in three or four hospitals 
or in several clinics, each with its own set of alerts and order sets.  Thus, 
although these older doctors may be familiar with the range of medications 
and dosages, there are often formulary preferences that are imposed by the 
institution.  With differing alert levels and combinations of medications in 
differing order sets, the possibilities of errors increase markedly. 
In sum, CDS is a wonderful idea.  It can wisely build on the databases 
and the computing capability of medical and digital technology.  As Ridgely 
and Greenberg so well describe, however, CDS leaves clinicians and 
medical facilities vulnerable to liabilities even if they are supremely careful in 
how they practice medicine and in how they use the technology.12  I have 
attempted to show three additional limitations and linked vulnerabilities 
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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
316 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY [Vol. 5:311 
associated with the use of CDS.  As with the other liabilities noted by Ridgely 
and Greenberg, these issues are equally hazardous to clinicians, medical 
institutions, and even vendors, no matter what medical or IT choices they 
make. 
There are two directions for finding solutions to these problems: (1) by 
building better CDS, and (2) by the legal protections outlined by the 
authors.  I offer some suggestions for the first solution, and I briefly 
comment on the difficulties of the second solution: 
 Solution One–Better CDS 
a. If U.S. HIT had uniform data standards and true interoperability, then 
CDS could mine the full array of medical and treatment outcome 
data to provide more nuanced advice to clinicians.  CDS could take 
into account the several co-morbidities and the dozen or so other 
medications used by the patient before giving suggestions. 
b. Incorporating even more information about the patient (e.g., recent 
surgery, disease history) would also be facilitated by data standards 
and interoperability. 
c. Harmonizing alert levels, drug-drug interaction databases, and order 
sets would solve many of the problems for physicians who move from 
location to location. 
d. Instituting a national panel to establish and harmonize alert levels, 
drug-drug interaction databases, and order sets would not only 
improve patient safety, it would eliminate millions of unproductive 
professional person-hours spent hacking out usually small differences 
in those rules.  This would save money for medical care.  Also, we 
could bring the best minds to work on the problems, rather than 
allowing local shouting matches to determine treatment options and 
medication levels at 5,200 hospitals or hundreds of thousands of 
medical practices. Several nations have such national panels and 
they are widely appreciated.13 
 Solution Two–Better Liability Options 
I leave the discussion of liability to the lawyers, Ridgely and Greenberg.  
To facilitate that discussion, I offer merely a list of the often-competing 
vested interests in allocating liability.  The list, by itself, is daunting; and 
these players will undoubtedly be involved in determining the outcome of 
the struggle.  These players include: HIT vendors, clinicians, healthcare 
information management personnel, medical institutions, consultants who 
assist with HIT implementations, political supporters, vendors’ insurance 
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companies, medical malpractice liability carriers, risk management offices, 
lobbyists, patient safety advocates who look to HIT, and the many 
professional and trade associations.  Added to this list must be the 
organization that is now helping to coordinate the effort to expand HIT and 
to make CDS more tractable.  That organization is the Department of 
Health and Human Services (“HHS”), working through its many agencies 
(Office of the National Coordinator of HIT; CMS, research offices) and 
through subsidies, regulations, penalties, and its many public relations 
agents.  These many agencies help ensure and maintain the strenuous 
support for HIT and CDS as a key perceived remedy for high medical costs 
and patient safety problems.  It matters not if the motivations for this 
production were self-serving (nurtured and produced by HIT vendors and 
true believers); or if it is the effort of medical informatics scholars with the 
laudatory goals of enhanced efficiency and patient safety.  Undoubtedly, it 
was a combination of rationales.  Whatever the origins, or the roles of 
armies of lobbyists and business organizations, it is clear that these liability 
conundrums have not heretofore received sufficient attention given their 
power to disrupt the otherwise extraordinary effort.  Liability risk may emerge 
as the uncontrollable diva in the production which, unless subdued, may 
prove ultimately disastrous to the entire undertaking. 
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